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THE COURT MUST PLAY ITS INTERPRETATIVE ROLE: DEFENDING THE DEFEND 
TRADE SECRETS ACT’S EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH 
Jada Colon 
Abstract 
 The exact reach of the Defend Trade Secrets Act’s extraterritoriality provision has yet to 
be interpreted by the courts. If United States securities, trademark, and antitrust law serves as any 
indication of what is to be expected, the Defend Trade Secrets Act may be subject to an inconsistent 
array of interpretation. When faced with interpreting the extraterritorial scope of the Defend 
Trade Secrets Act for the first time, the court must set a strong precedent by enacting a single, 
uniform effects test that will not falter when applied in different circumstances and by different 
circuits. Courts interpreting United States securities, trademark, and antitrust law have enacted a 
wide variety of effects tests for interpreting extraterritoriality. Generally, the language of the 
effects test being applied has such an expansive interpretation, causing the courts to struggle with 
applying it in a consistent manner. 
 
 Using trade secret policy, legislative intent, and the history of the Defend Trade Secret Act 
as a guide, this paper encourages the courts to enact a “misappropriation effects” test when 
determining the extraterritorial reach of the statute. A “misappropriation effects” test will take 
away the emphasis on the level of effects necessary to give rise to a showing of effects, and focus 
the inquiry on the nature of effects necessary to give rise to a showing of effects sufficient to confer 
extraterritorial reach. The “misappropriation effects” test shifts the focus to the specific 
misappropriation effects that Congress sought to protect against in proscribing the Defend Trade 
Secrets Act. It is imperative that the courts interpret the extraterritoriality provision of the Defend 
Trade Secrets Act with care so that it does not confine within the United States, what Congress 
intended to reach abroad. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that an engineer from your company’s subsidiary, located in another country, has 
joined a competitor and has begun to use your trade secrets.1 In an attempt to avoid the uncertainty 
and expense of suing in another country’s court, you contact your Intellectual Property attorney. 
To your surprise, your attorney has informed you that the United States has recently passed trade 
secret legislation that may be extended extraterritorially to reach misappropriation outside of the 
United States.2 Your lawyer then warns you that, due to the recent enactment of the legislation, 
                                                 
1 Dave Bohrer, Extending US Trade Secret Law to Reach IP Theft in China, FLAT FEE IP, (Apr. 11, 2017), 
http://www.flatfeeipblog.com/2017/04/articles/trade-secrets/extending-us-trade-secret-law-to-reach-ip-theft-in-
china/. 
2  See id. 
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the courts have yet to interpret the extraterritorially provision in the statute.3 The interpretation can 
go a variety of ways, some to your benefit or some to your detriment.4 
 
Congress enacted the Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”), creating a federal civil cause 
of action for the misappropriation of trade secrets related to interstate commerce.5 A trade secret 
generally refers to intellectual property such as a “formula, process, device, or other business 
information” that is kept confidential to give the owner a competitive advantage in its market.6 
The unauthorized disclosure of which, would bring significant harm to the owner.7 A unique 
feature of the DTSA is its extraterritorial reach.8 The DTSA expressly applies to conduct outside 
the United States under two circumstances: (1) the offender must be “a natural person who is a 
citizen or permanent resident alien of the United States, or an organization organized under the 
laws of the United States or a State or political subdivision thereof;” or (2) the act in furtherance 
of the offense must be committed in the United States.9 By conditioning the extraterritorial reach 
of the DTSA upon proof of “an act in furtherance of the offense was committed in the United 
States,” Congress may have confined within the United States borders what was intended to reach 
beyond them.10 
 
In the above-described trade secret misappropriation in a foreign country, the actionable 
conduct is seen to have occurred outside of the United States.11 While the activity did occur outside 
of the United States, there is harm occurring in the United States because a United States company 
owns the trade secret at issue.12 In non-trade secret cases, federal courts have enacted various 
versions of an effects tests for applying federal extraterritorial provisions.13 Generally, in using an 
effects test, the statute will apply to a foreign entity if the conduct is found to have sufficient effects 
in the United States.14 The courts will have to create a uniform test to be applied when interpreting 
the phrase “an act in furtherance of the offense” committed in the United States.15 How courts 
interpret the phrase “in furtherance of the offense” within a DTSA claim will have a significant 
effect on the extraterritorial reach of the statute and remains to be seen.16 
 
This note analyzes various methods of interpretation that may be applied to the 
extraterritorial provision in the DTSA and advocates for a “misappropriation effects” test. This 
note analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of the various methods of interpretation that have 
                                                 
3 See Trends & Insights: The Defend Trade Secrets Act Nine Months Later, DENTONS, (Feb. 28, 2017), 
https://www.dentons.com/en/insights/alerts/2017/february/28/trends-insights-the-defend-trade-secrets-act-nine-
months-later. 
4 See Bohrer, supra note 1. 
5 Bret Cohen, Michael Renaud & Nicholas Armington, Explaining the Defend Trade Secrets Act, BUSINESS LAW 
TODAY (Sept. 2016), available at https://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2016/09/03_cohen.html. 
6 Trade Secret, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
7 Trade Secret, Black’s Law Dictionary (2d ed. 1910). 
8 See Dentons, supra note 3. 
9 18 U.S.C.S. § 1837 (West 2018). 
10 Bohrer, supra note 1. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 See id. 
16 See id. 
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been faced by the courts in applying federal extraterritoriality statutes. Part II discusses the current 
provisions of the federal trade secret laws and the history of the DTSA. Part III introduces various 
federal statutes and the extraterritorial interpretation undertaken by the courts when determining 
their reach. Part IV discusses the importance of the interpretation of the DTSA’s extraterritorial 
provision, the ramifications the interpretation will have on the applicability of the statute, and the 
influence the legal history has on its interpretation. Part V proposes the correct interpretation of 
the extraterritorial provision, comparing all methods of interpretation and examines how the 
proposal is supported by public policy, current political trends, and the intent of the drafters. 
Finally, Part VI concludes this Note, advocating for the creation of a “misappropriation effects” 
test to be used in determining the extraterritorial reach of the DTSA. 
 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND OF THE DEFEND TRADE SECRETS ACT 
In 2014, the estimated value of trade secret theft in the United States was roughly $200 to 
$550 billion per year.17 In response to trade secret theft reaching unprecedented levels, Congress 
proposed the Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”).18 Enacted on May 11, 2016, the DTSA creates 
a federal civil cause of action for the misappropriation of trade secrets “related to a product or 
service used in, or intended for use in, interstate or foreign commerce.”19 Information is protectable 
as a trade secret under the DTSA if the owner has “taken reasonable measures to keep such 
information secret” and “the information derives independent economic value, actual or potential, 
from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable through proper means by, 
another person who can obtain economic value from the disclosure or use of the information.”20 A 
plaintiff must show misappropriation by alleging either: “(1) acquisition of a trade secret by a 
person who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means; 
or (2) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied consent by a person 
who used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret or knows or had reason to know 
that the trade secret was acquired by improper means.”21 
 
Prior to the enactment of the DTSA, companies seeking remedies for the misappropriation 
of trade secrets could only sue in state court, where laws protecting the misappropriation of trade 
secrets vary from state to state in the text of the laws themselves and in their application.22 While 
the DTSA generally extends similar protections to those afforded by most states, it provides a 
uniform statute to be applied consistently in federal court.23 
 
                                                 
17 Center for Responsible Enterprise and Trade, Economic Impact of Trade Secret Theft: A framework for companies 
to safeguard trade secrets and mitigate potential threats CREATE.ORG, (Feb. 2014), 
https://create.org/resource/economic-impact-of-trade-secret-theft/. 
18 John Cannan, A [Mostly] Legislative History of the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (May 4, 2016) available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2775390. 
19 Cohen, Renaud & Armington, supra note 5. 
20 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(a)(b) (West 2018). 
21 Id. at § 1839(5)(a)(b). 
22 Cohen, Renaud & Armington, supra note 5. 
23 Id. 
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A. STATUTORY PROVISIONS OF THE DEFEND TRADE SECRETS ACT 
The DTSA’s substantive provisions contain various components. The DTSA provides a 
federal civil cause of action for the misappropriation of trade secrets.24 The statute employs a 
uniform definition for the critical terms “trade secret” and “misappropriation.”25 The DTSA 
defines “trade secret” as: 
 
All forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or 
engineering information, including patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, 
formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, 
programs, or codes, whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored, 
compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically, graphically, 
photographically, or in writing if (A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable 
measures to keep such information secret; and (B) the information derives 
independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known 
to, and not being readily ascertainable through proper means by, another person 
who can obtain economic value from the disclosure or use of the information.26 
The acts that constitute misappropriation are also described specifically under the statute.27 The 
DTSA defines “misappropriation” as: 
 
Acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to 
know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or Disclosure or use of 
a trade secret of another without express or implied consent by a person who used 
improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; at the time of disclosure 
or use, knew or had reason to know that the knowledge of the trade secret was 
derived from or through a person who had used improper means to acquire the trade 
secret; acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain the secrecy 
of the trade secret or limit the use of the trade secret; or derived from or through a 
person who owed a duty to the person seeking relief to maintain the secrecy of the 
trade secret or limit the use of the trade secret; or before a material change of the 
position of the person, knew or had reason to know that the trade secret was a trade 
secret; and knowledge of the trade secret had been acquired by accident or 
mistake.28 
 
The DTSA contains civil seizures and other remedies.29 The civil seizure mechanism 
established by the statute is a preventative measure that can be used prior to a formal finding of 
misappropriation in which the court, on ex parte application by the trade-secret owner, may “issue 
an order providing for the seizure of property necessary to prevent the propagation or 
                                                 
24 K&L Gates LLP, Emerging Trends in Defend Trade Secrets Litigation, JD SUPRA, (Sept. 27, 2017), 
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/emerging-trends-in-defend-trade-secrets-45468/. 
25 Cohen, Renaud & Armington, supra note 5. 
26 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2018). 
27 Id. at § 1839. 
28 Id. at § 1839(5). 
29 Cohen, Renaud & Armington, supra note 5. 
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dissemination of the trade secret that is the subject of the action.”30 Civil seizure may only be 
ordered under “extraordinary circumstances” and requires a showing that: 
 
An order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 or other equitable relief would be 
inadequate; an immediate and irreparable injury will occur if seizure is not ordered; 
harm to the applicant from denial of a seizure order: (1) outweighs the harm to the 
person against whom seizure is ordered; and (2) substantially outweighs the harm 
to any third parties by such seizure; the applicant is likely to succeed in showing 
that the person against whom the order is issued misappropriated or conspired to 
misappropriate a trade secret through improper means; the person against whom 
the order will be issued has possession of the trade secret and any property to be 
seized; the application describes with reasonable particularity the property to be 
seized and, to the extent reasonable under the circumstances, the property’s 
location; the person against whom seizure is ordered would destroy, move, hide, or 
otherwise make such property inaccessible to the court if put on notice; and the 
applicant has not publicized the requested seizure.31 
 
Pursuant to civil seizures being an extraordinary measure, courts have been reluctant to grant such 
relief.32 Since the enactment of the DTSA, only one court has granted an ex parte seizure.33  
 
The most common form of relief under the DTSA is an injunction preventing actual or 
threatened misappropriation of trade secrets, provided that the injunction does not “prevent a 
person from entering into an employment relationship,” and that any conditions placed on 
employment are based on “evidence of threatened misappropriation and not merely on the 
information the person knows.”34 The statutory language of the injunction provision has led many 
academics and commentators to believe that Congress expressly chose not to recognize the 
inevitable disclosure doctrine, a doctrine that justifies prohibiting employees to work for 
competitors when their new employment will inevitably lead them to rely on the owner’s trade 
secrets.35 Additionally, “in exceptional circumstances that render an injunction inequitable,” the 
court may condition future use of a trade secret on the payment of a royalty.36 If a court finds that 
the misappropriation of a trade secret did occur, damages for actual loss cause by the 
misappropriation and damages for unjust enrichment not addressed in computing damages for 
actual loss may be awarded to the plaintiff.37 The court may award exemplary damages if the trade 
secret is “willfully and maliciously misappropriated,” not to exceed more than 2 times the amount 
                                                 
30 Id.  
31 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (West 2018). 
32 Dentons, supra note 3. 
33 Id.; Mission Capital Advisors LLC v. Romaka,  No. 1:16-cv-05878-LLS (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2016)(denying request 
for broader seizure order, but granting seizure of contact list) available at 
https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=23
99&context=historical. 
34 Cohen, Renaud & Armington, supra note 5; 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (West 2018). 
35 K&L Gates LLP, supra note 24. 
36 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (West 2018). 
37 Id. 
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of actual damages.38 Lastly, the court may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party 
if a claim of the misappropriation is made in bad faith.39 
 
The DTSA contains a whistleblower immunity clause that acts as a safe harbor for 
employees to disclose a trade secret to an attorney or federal, state, or local government officials 
“solely for the purpose of reporting or investigating suspected violation of the law.”40 The DTSA 
additionally mandates that the statute should not be interpreted as preempting state law and that a 
cause of action may only be brought for acts occurring on or after its enactment date.41 
 
B. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE DEFEND TRADE SECRETS ACT 
The DTSA was drafted as an expansion and amendment from three other pieces of 
legislation.42 In amending three pieces of existing legislation to create the DTSA, the drafters may 
have intended for the statute’s future interpretation to be based off the interpretation of the 
legislation that came before it.43 Thus, it is important to analyze the language of the DTSA against 
the statutes it derived from.44 
 
First, a large part of the DTSA can be best understood as an amendment to the Economic 
Espionage Act of 1996 (“EEA”), which criminalizes trade secret theft.45 The DTSA adopts, 
amends, and adds to the EEA’s former existing definitions. Under the EEA, the term “trade secret” 
was defined as: 
 
All forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or 
engineering information, including patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, 
formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, 
programs, or codes, whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored, 
compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically, graphically, 
photographically, or in writing if (A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable 
measures to keep such information secret; and (B) the information derives 
independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known 
to, and not being readily ascertainable through proper means by, the public.46 
 
The use of the word “public” at the end of the statute deviated from the definition of a trade secret 
under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”), creating confusion with the courts because it 
raised the possibility that the distinction between the two was potentially meaningful.47 To remedy 
this problem, in drafting the DTSA, the legislature struck the word “public” and added the phrase, 
                                                 
38 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (West 2018). 
39 Id. 
40 K&L Gates LLP, supra note 24. 
41 Id. 
42 Cannan, supra note 18. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
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“another person who can obtain economic value from the disclosure or use of the information.”48 
In making this change, the legislature intended this part of the definition match that of the UTSA.49 
The DTSA’s definition of misappropriation is also substantially similar to the UTSA’s.50 In 
drawing definitions from the UTSA, the legislature sought not to alter the balance of current trade 
secret law or courts’ previous decisions.51 
 
Secondly, the DTSA’s civil remedies for the misappropriation of trade secrets derive 
significantly from the UTSA.52 The DTSA draws from sections 2-5 of the UTSA.53 Similar to the 
UTSA, the DTSA allows courts to grant injunctions to prevent actual or threatened 
misappropriation, if appropriate, require affirmative actions to protect the trade secret, and in 
exceptional circumstances require a royalty to be paid for the time period in which the use could 
have been prohibited.54 The drafters, concerned about protecting worker mobility, made an 
addition.55 Unlike the USTA, the DTSA contains a protective measure that requires any conditions 
imposed on taking new employment must be related to trade secret misappropriation and not mere 
personal knowledge.56 Furthermore, this relief cannot conflict with state laws against restraints on 
the lawful practice of a profession trade or business.57 The award provisions of the DTSA also 
derive significantly from section 3 of the UTSA.58 The award provisions in both acts provide 
damages for actual losses and unjust enrichment or provide a reasonable royalty.59 In applying the 
UTSA, state courts view the royalty provision as a measure of last resort.60 Additionally, both acts 
include exemplary damages for willful and malicious misappropriation not to exceed more than 
two times the amount of damages awarded.61 
 
Lastly, the DTSA’s ex parte seizure provisions are developed in part from the Lanham 
Act.62 While many provisions of the DTSA mirror the Lanham Act, there are a couple noticeable 
differences.63 Because trade secrets are often in intangible form, the DTSA broadened the scope 
of the Lanham Act, which contains an ex parte seizure procedure covering only physical goods.64 
The DTSA supplements the Lanham Act’s ex parte seizure, taking away the emphasis on physical 
goods and adds a “possession” requirement.65 In requiring the person whom seizure would be 
ordered to have “possession,” the legislature was concerned with shielding third parties, such as 
                                                 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id.  
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
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internet service providers or operators of servers where another party has stored a misappropriated 
trade secret, from seizure.66 
 
III. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF FEDERAL LAW 
 
A. UNITED STATES SECURITIES LAW AND THE MORRISON DECISION 
Until June 2010, federal courts in securities law cases had used the well-established 
conducts and effects tests when interpreting the extraterritorial reach of the Securities Act and the 
Securities Exchange Act.67 Using the effects test, the court will analyze whether the wrongful 
conduct of the foreign entity has a substantial effect in the United States.68 The Second Circuit 
introduced the effects test in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, holding that the court has subject matter 
jurisdiction over violations of securities law even if the transactions alleged take place outside of 
the United States as long as the transactions effect America and American citizens.69 Thereafter, 
the courts expanded upon the “effects test,” requiring the effects to be strong enough to generate 
“foreseeable and substantial harm to interests in the United States.”70  The courts also stipulated 
that mere adverse effects do not meet the requirements of the effects test.71 
 
In an attempt to fix a loophole, the court adopted the conducts test, which analyzes whether 
the wrongful conduct actually occurred in the United States.72 Under the conducts test, a court can 
obtain jurisdiction over foreign entities if the transactions involve domestic misconduct.73 The 
Court in Alfadda v. Fenn held that the “conducts test” is satisfied when “(1) the defendant’s 
activities in the United States were more than ‘merely preparatory’ to a securities fraud conducted 
elsewhere, and (2) these activities or culpable failures to act within the United States ‘directly 
caused’ the claimed losses.”74 Although formulated at different times, the effects and conducts test 
are used in conjunction.75 
 
In its landmark decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank, the Supreme Court 
rejected the fact-intensive “conducts/effects” tests, articulating a “bright-line” test to be used when 
                                                 
66 Id. 
67 Jonathan Richman, Ralp Ferrara, Ann Ashton & Tanya Dmitronow, So Much for Bright Line Tests on 
Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Securities Laws? PROSKAUER, (Aug. 18, 2014), 
http://www.proskauer.com/publications/client-alert/so-much-for-bright-line-tests-on-extraterritorial-reach-of-us-
securities-laws/. 
68 John Koury, Extraterritoriality for Securities Fraud Post-Morrison (Feb. 3, 2015) available at 
http://law.emory.edu/ecgar/_documents/volumes/1/1/koury.pdf. 
69 Junsun Park, Global Expansion of National Securities Laws: Extraterritoriality and Jurisdictional Conflicts, 12 
U.N.H. L. REV. 69 (2014), available at http://scholars.unh.edu/unh_lr/vol12/iss1/5; Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 
F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), abrogated by Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). 
70 Park, supra note 69.  
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Park, supra note 69; Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475, 478 (2d Cir. 1991), abrogated by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869.  
75 Park, supra note 69. 
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determining the extraterritoriality of United States securities law.76 Morrison’s bright-line rule 
reaffirms the “longstanding principal of American law” that “absent a clear Congressional 
expression of a statute’s extraterritorial application, a statue lacks extraterritorial reach.”77 In 
deciding this case, the Supreme Court introduced significant changes to the interpretation of the 
extraterritorial reach of securities law.78 The Court introduced a transaction test, which allows 
securities law to apply to cases where “(1) fraudulent actions in question involve transactions in 
securities listed on domestic exchanges; and (2) domestic transactions in other securities.”79 
Furthermore, Morrison held that the scope of the Exchange Act's extraterritorial effect is not a 
jurisdictional issue, but rather involves a substantive element of the claim.80 
 
Within a month after the Morrison decision was issued, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”), addressing the 
extraterritorial reach of United States securities law.81 The Dodd-Frank Act adds to the Securities 
Act and the Securities Exchange Act stating that the federal district courts “shall 
have jurisdiction of any action or proceeding brought or instituted by the [SEC] or the United 
States” alleging a securities-law violation involving: “(1) conduct within the United States that 
constitutes significant steps in furtherance of the violation, even if the securities transaction occurs 
outside the United States and involves only foreign investors; or (2) conduct occurring outside the 
United States that has a foreseeable substantial effect within the United States (emphasis added).”82 
 
The Dodd-Frank Act’s provision was put into place to speak only to the courts’ jurisdiction, 
not amending or altering substantive securities law.83 But this raised the question of whether the 
Dodd-Frank Act still restored the conducts and effects test.84 The District Court for the District of 
Utah was the first to tackle the tension between the Dodd-Frank Act and the Morrison decision.85 
In SEC v. Traffic Monsoon, a Utah-based company allegedly participating in an illegal Ponzi 
scheme sold advertising packages over the internet to consumers located outside of the United 
States.86 The SEC argued that the Dodd-Frank Act extends the extraterritorial reach of the statute 
based on the significant, allegedly wrongful conduct that took place in the United States.87 The 
Court acknowledged that the Dodd-Frank Act did not explicitly overturn Morrison, but held that 
the presumption against extraterritoriality was rebutted by the statutes history of amendment, 
                                                 
76 Park, supra note 69; Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869. 
77 Louis M. Solomon, Second Circuit, Which Created the “Conduct and Effects” Test To Determine 
Extraterritoriality, Applies Morrison To Preclude Extraterritorial Application of RICO Claim in International 
Litigation Context, ONE WORLD INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE BLOG, (Oct. 4, 2010), 
http://blog.internationalpractice.org/international-practice/second-circuit-which-created-the-conduct-and-effects-
test-to-detemine-extraterritoriality-applies-morrison-to-preclude-extraterritorial-application-of-rico-claim-in-
international-litigation-cont.html. 
78 Solomon, supra note 77; Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2869. 
79 Solomon, supra note 77; Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2888. 
80 Solomon, supra note 77; Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2873. 
81 Jonathan E. Richman, Proskauer Rose Discusses the SEC’s Extraterritorial Reach, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG, 
(Apr. 11, 2017), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/04/11/proskauer-rose-discusses-the-secs-extraterritorial-
reach/. 
82 12 U.S.C. 5301 (West 2018). 
83 Richman, supra note 81. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 SEC v. Traffic Monsoon, LLC, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1275 (D. Utah 2017). 
87 Richman, supra note 81. 
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underlying purpose, and legislative history.88 The Court applied the conducts test, concluding that 
because the Defendant operated in the United States, the securities statute applied.89 Furthermore, 
the Court went on to also apply the transactional test, holding that because Defendant sold their 
products over the internet, incurring liability in the United States to deliver the products to the 
buyers, the securities statute applied.90 Effectively, the Dodd-Frank Act was interpreted to revive 
the conducts and effects test for governmental securities actions.91 
 
Between the Morrison decision and the Dodd-Frank Act, the courts and Congress have 
engaged in a run-around, attempting to find common ground for applying a uniform test to 
determine the extraterritorial reach of United States securities law. Unable to ascertain how to 
construe the extraterritorial reach of United States securities law, the District Court for the District 
of Utah was led to use both the conducts and effects test and the transaction test in their analysis.92 
The Traffic Monsoon decision is now up for appeal and will be interpreted further by the Tenth 
Circuit.93 
 
B. UNITED STATES TRADEMARK LAW AND THE LANHAM ACT 
Similar to United States securities law, United States trademark law also takes an effects 
test approach to determining the extraterritorial scope of the Lanham Act.94 The level of effect 
necessary to trigger the extraterritorial reach of the Lanham Act varies by circuit.95 Circuits often 
require a plaintiff to prove that a defendant’s actions had “substantial,” “significant,” “more than 
insignificant,” or “some” effect.96 
 
Over sixty years ago in Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., the Supreme Court determined the 
extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act.97 The defendant, a U.S. citizen sold fake Bulova-
branded watches in Mexico without Bulova’s consent.98 After receiving complaints from various 
jewelers around the Mexico border, Bulova brought suit in the United States.99 In assessing the 
extraterritorial reach of the Lanham Act to the defendant’s conduct, the Supreme Court held that 
the defendant’s “operations and their effects were not confined within the territorial limits of a 
                                                 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Richman, supra note 81; Traffic Monsoon, LLC, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1275. 
93 Richman, supra note 81. 
94 Edwards Wildman, Extraterritorial reach of the Lanham Act: a viable option, World Trademark Review 
(Oct./Nov. 2013) available at http://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/Magazine/Issue/45/Country-
correspondents/United-States-Edwards-Wildman-Palmer-LLP. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Julia Anne Matheson & Anna Naydonov, Standing Ground: An Analysis of Territoriality in U.S. Trademark Law, 
World Trademark Review (Oct./Nov. 2013) available at https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/standing-ground-an-
analysis-of-territoriality-in-u-s-trademark.html; Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952). 
98 Matheson & Naydonov, supra note 97; Steele, 344 U.S. at 285. 
99 Matheson & Naydonov, supra note 97; Steele, 344 U.S. at 285. 
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foreign nation.”100 Rather, the Court held that because the defendant’s operations and their effects 
reached the United States, the statute applied.101  
 
Steele established the concept that Congress has the power to regulate its own citizens’ 
activities, even if they take place on foreign soil.102 Infringements made on behalf of foreign 
citizens on foreign soil, however, must be analyzed differently.103 In such a case, courts will focus 
on how the conduct effect’s commerce in the United States by analyzing factors such as the impact 
on a trademark owner’s reputation or sales at home.104 From Steele, the Second Circuit in Vanity 
Fair Mills, Inc v. T Eaton Co. developed a widely adopted three-factor test for the extraterritorial 
application of the Lanham Act: “the defendant’s conduct must have a substantial effect on U.S. 
commerce; the defendant must be a U.S. citizen; and there must be no conflict with trademark 
rights under the foreign law.”105 
 
The Ninth Circuit adopted a more flexible multi-factor test requiring: “Some effect on 
American foreign commerce; that this effect is sufficiently great to present a cognizable injury to 
a trademark owner under the Lanham Act; and that the interests of and links to American foreign 
commerce [are] sufficiently strong in relation to those of other nations to justify an assertion of 
extraterritorial authority.”106 The third factor breaks down into a seven-part test: 
 
the degree of conflict with foreign policy; the nationality of the foreign parties and 
their principal places of business; the extent to which enforcement by either country 
will achieve compliance; the relative significance of the effects on the United States 
as compared to those elsewhere; whether there is specific purpose to harm or affect 
U.S. commerce;  the foreseeability of harm or effect on U.S. commerce; and the 
relative importance of the violations charged of conduct within the United States as 
compared with foreign conduct.107 
 
 The First Circuit established an alternative framework, in McBee v. Delica Co.108 In this 
case, plaintiff sued a Japanese company that operated a chain of clothing stores under plaintiff’s 
trademark name.109 The Japanese company did not sell the clothing outside of Japan and declined 
orders from the United States.110 In determining extraterritorial teach, the First Circuit first looked 
at whether the defendant was a United States citizen.111 The rationale being that the courts have a 
separate constitutional basis for controlling the activities of its citizens.112 If the defendant is not a 
United States citizen, the courts will analyze whether the foreign defendant’s conduct has “a 
                                                 
100 Matheson & Naydonov, supra note 97; Steele, 344 U.S. at 286. 
101 Matheson & Naydonov, supra note 97; Steele, 344 U.S. at 286. 
102 Matheson & Naydonov, supra note 97. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Matheson & Naydonov, supra note 97; Vanity Fair Mills, Inc v. T Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 643 (2d Cir. 1956). 
106 Matheson & Naydonov, supra note 97; Reebok In’t, Ltd v. Marnatech Enters, 970 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir 1992). 
107 Matheson & Naydonov, supra note 97; Reebok In’t, Ltd, 970 F.2d at 555. 
108 Matheson & Naydonov, supra note 97; McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F. 3d 107 (1st Cir. 2005). 
109 Matheson & Naydonov, supra note 97; McBee, 417 F. 3d at 112. 
110 Matheson & Naydonov, supra note 97; McBee, 417 F. 3d at 112. 
111 Matheson & Naydonov, supra note 97; McBee, 417 F. 3d at 119. 
112 Matheson & Naydonov, supra note 97; McBee, 417 F. 3d at 119. 
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substantial effect on United States commerce.”113 The Court concluded in McBee that the 
defendant’s activities in Japan did not rise to a level of substantial effect on United States 
commerce.114 
 
 With the Supreme Court silent on the issue for over half a century, courts have generally 
favored application of the Steele framework, with a predominant focus on whether the infringing 
activity abroad has a “substantial effect” on United States commerce.115 In determining the 
extraterritorial reach in trademark cases, applicable authority will determine the level of activity 
and contact necessary to link a defendant’s actions to United States commerce.116 Generally, each 
circuit shows a trend towards broadening the scope of the application, while the stringent 
requirements for determining the substantial effect on United States commerce have started to 
diminish.117 
 
C. UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAW AND THE SHERMAN ACT 
The Sherman Act contains an extraterritoriality provision, applying the act to “trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations.”118 Initially, the courts applied United 
States antitrust law exclusively to conduct occurring on United States territory, based on the notion 
that a state’s jurisdiction is limited to events occurring within its borders.119 With the increase in 
anticompetitive conduct and the negative effects of such conduct occurring in two different 
territories, strict territoriality was no longer appropriate.120  
 
In the first opinion applying the statute extraterritorially, Judge Learned Hand stated, “[i]t 
is settled case law that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, 
for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders which the state 
reprehends.”121 In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, a Canadian company combined with 
European producers of aluminum to control the amount of aluminum sold on the United States.122 
Their agreement took place outside of the United States.123 The Court held that because their 
                                                 
113 Matheson & Naydonov, supra note 97; McBee, 417 F. 3d at 119. 
114 Matheson & Naydonov, supra note 97; McBee, 417 F. 3d at 124. 
115 Matheson & Naydonov, supra note 97. 
116 Wildman, supra note 94. 
117 Wildman, supra note 94. 
118 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). 
119Andre Fiebig, The Increasing Importance of EU Competition Law for U.S. Companies, BUSINESS LAW TODAY, 
(Jan. 2016), available at https://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2016/01/06_fiebig.html; American Banana 
Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). 
120 Fiebig, supra note 119. 
121 Fiebig, supra note 119; United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945)[hereinafter 
Alcoa]. 
122 Edward L. Rholl, Inconsistent Application of the Extraterritorial Provisions of the Sherman Act: A Judicial 
Response Based Upon the Much Maligned Effects Test, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 435, 441 (1990) available at 
http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol73/iss3/4; Alcoa, 148 F.2d 439-41. 
123 Rholl, supra note 122; Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 439-41. 
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conduct affected United States commerce, the antitrust statute was applicable.124 This departure 
from strict territoriality became known as the effects test.125 
 
Following Alcoa, courts felt compelled to refine the very broad effects test outlined by 
Judge Hand, causing the test to get refined and redefined in ways that created a wide disparity in 
interpretation among the circuits.126 Among these attempts, courts introduced: a direct and 
substantial effects test, a disparate effects test, a substantial and material effects test, some effects 
test, and so on.127 This problem was heightened by the Supreme Court’s refusal to hear cases that 
might require it to construct a uniform definition to be applied by all circuits.128 
 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was the first court to abandon the effects test 
when examining the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act.129 The Court held that the effects 
test was incomplete because it failed to consider other nations interest or the full nature of the 
relationship between the actors and the country.130 Instead, the Court introduced a balancing of 
interests test, weighing three questions: “(1) Does the alleged restraint effect, or was it intended to 
effect, foreign commerce of the United States; (2) Is it of such a type and magnitude so as to be 
cognizable as a violation of the Sherman Act; and (3) As a matter of international comity and 
fairness, should the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the U.S. be asserted to cover it?”131 While part 
one of the balancing test is seen to echo the effects test introduced by Judge Hand, it is subject to 
a broader reading.132 The Ninth Circuit was followed by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 
adopting its own balancing test by asking two questions: “(1) Does subject matter jurisdiction 
exist? and (2) If jurisdiction does exist, should it be exercised?”133 The first question in the 
balancing test is to be analyzed using the effects test.134 
 
Congress attempted to remedy the confusion, passing the Foreign Trade Antitrust 
Improvements Act (“FTAIA”).135 The FTAIA provides that the Sherman Act will have 
extraterritorial reach if the conduct involving trade or commerce with foreign nations has a “direct, 
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on trade or commerce in the United States.136 
However, Congress failed to achieve the exact clarity it had hoped for. 
 
While the FTAIA enables the courts to apply a single “direct, substantial, and reasonably 
foreseeable effect” test, interpreting what rises to the level of effect will differ depending on 
                                                 
124 Rholl, supra note 122; Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443-44. 
125 Rholl, supra note 122; Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 444. 
126 Rholl, supra note 122 at 442. 
127 Id. at 446-51. 
128 Id. at 443. 
129 Rholl, supra note 122, at 451; Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). 
130 Rholl, supra note 122, at 451-52; Timberlane Lumber Co., 549 F.2d at 611-12. 
131 Rholl, supra note 122, at 452; Timberlane Lumber Co., 549 F.2d at 615. 
132 Rholl, supra note 122, at 452. 
133 Rholl, supra note 122, at 454; Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1290 (3d Cir. 1979). 
134 Rholl, supra note 122, at 454; Mannington Mills, Inc., 595 F.2d 1291-92. 
135 Mark S. Popofsky, Extraterritoriality in U.S. Jurisprudence, ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY, 2417, 
2426 (2008), available at https://www.ropesgray.com/files/Publication/afdb976a-fabf-4af0-873c-
0de0ddc2d7ea/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/92b888ee-e922-418a-8048-0ec0c0fac9bb/Popofsky-Antitrust-
Jurisprudence-Competition-Law-and-Policy.pdf. 
136 Popofsky, supra note 135, at 2427; 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(3). 
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different factual scenarios. Courts have addressed the issue of what is a “direct, substantial, and 
reasonably foreseeable effect” in various ways.137 Limiting the extraterritorial reach of the statute, 
courts have held that an individual or a specific corporation suffering an effect from a foreign 
anticompetitive agreement was insufficient to constitute a “direct, substantial, and reasonably 
foreseeable effect.”138 The court in McGlinchy v. Shell Chemical Co. held that, rather than alleging 
an antitrust injury to individuals or individual firms, a plaintiff must allege antitrust injury to the 
market or competition in general, the only exception being where injury to an individual causes 
injury to an entire marketplace.139 
 
The extraterritoriality provision in the Sherman Act may also reach foreign conduct if the 
effect is the elimination or significant reduction of competition in an appropriate market.140 For 
example, in Coors Brewing v. Miller Brewing Co., the Court held that the conduct of the foreign 
entity would have a direct impact on the United States, because such conduct would limit the 
domestic beer market to only two competitors.141 Elimination of competition can rise to the level 
of having a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” even if only one individual is 
injured because of the effect on the entire marketplace.142 
 
Courts interpreting the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act have held that injury to 
United States foreign-based subsidiary abroad alone, does not rise to the level of a direct and 
substantial effect of United States commerce.143 Rather, the primary injury to that subsidiary must 
be caused in the United States and substantially affect United States commerce.144 Furthermore, 
the location of negotiations or other conduct in the United States alone is not sufficient to prove 
an effect on United States commerce.145 
 
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, courts have long struggled with creating a uniform 
test to apply when determining the extraterritorial reach of various federal statutes. While looking 
to the interpretation of the extraterritorial provision in the EEA would have served as a great guide 
for predicting how the courts will handle the extraterritorial reach of the DTSA, there are no cases 
which do so.146 It is imperative that the courts address the extraterritorial reach of the DTSA in a 
uniform manner, enacting a single test to be applied in all cases.  
 
                                                 
137 Richard W. Beckler & Matthew H. Kirtland, Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Law: What Is a 
“Direct, Substantial, and Reasonably Foreseeable Effect” Under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act? 38 
TEX. INT’L. L.J. 11, 18. 
138 Id. at 137. 
139 Beckler & Kirtland, supra note 137; McGlinchy v. Shell Chemical Co., 845 F.2d 802, 812–13 (9th Cir. 1988). 
140 Beckler & Kirtland, supra note 137, at 19. 
141 Beckler & Kirtland, supra note 137, at 19; Coors Brewing Co. v. Miller Brewing Co., 889 F. Supp. 1394, 1397–
98 (D. Colo. 1995). 
142 Beckler & Kirtland, supra note 137, at 19; General Electric Co. v. Latin American Imports, S.A., 187 F. Supp. 2d 
749 (W.D. Ky. 2001). 
143 Beckler & Kirtland, supra note 137, at 20; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Heeremac, No. H-98-1698 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 
22, 1999). 
144 Beckler & Kirtland, supra note 137, at 20; Phillips Petroleum Co., No. H-98-1698 at 181.  
145 Beckler & Kirtland, supra note 137, at 20-21; United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chemical Co., 131 F. Supp. 2d 
1003, 1009 (N.D. Ill. 2001). 
146 Bohrer, supra note 1. 
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IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF INCONSISTENT EXTRATERRITORIALITY TESTS 
To fully understand the implications an inconsistent extraterritoriality test will have on the 
application of the DTSA, it is important to consider Congresses intent in passing the DTSA. 
Congress proposed the DTSA to combat rising levels of trade secret theft being felt in the United 
States.147 Prior to the enactment of the DTSA, a trade secret owner could bring a suit against 
infringers in state court, under state law.148 While 48 out of 50 states have adopted the UTSA, the 
adoption of the UTSA widely varied by jurisdiction.149 This resulted in inconsistencies across the 
United States in the protection afforded to a trade secret owner’s trade secret.150 Creating a single 
federal private right of action under the DTSA combats those inconsistencies by allowing trade 
secret owners to seek relief without having to account for the variations found under state law. In 
passing the DTSA, trade secret owners can better determine what information or property is 
protectable and predict the outcome of any cause of action they may bring. The uniformity sought 
by Congress in enacting the DTSA will be wholly undermined if the courts fail to implement a 
single uniform test for determining the statute’s extraterritorial reach.  
 
Congress also enacted the DTSA in an attempt to crack down on the theft of trade secrets 
by foreign entities or in some circumstances on foreign soil.151 Confirmed by the Supreme Court 
in Morrison, United States law has a presumption against extraterritoriality.152 The only exception 
being when Congress expresses the intent that a law applies to conduct overseas.153 By including 
in the statute that the act in furtherance of the offense must be committed in the United States, the 
DTSA satisfies the exception, overcoming the presumption against extraterritoriality. But how 
courts interpret the provision will have a significant impact on just how far the DTSA will reach. 
The courts can take a broad interpretation of the provision, extending liability to foreign conduct 
that has an effect on the United States, or a narrow interpretation, requiring some conduct to occur 
in the United States. The later interpretation would be of detriment to United States entities seeking 
redress for the misappropriation of their trade secrets by foreign entities and limit the 
extraterritorial scope of the DTSA greatly.  
 
V. UNIFORM EXTRATERRITORIALITY TEST 
Since its enactment in 2016, the courts have yet to be faced with the challenging task of 
interpreting the extraterritorial reach of the DTSA.154 Failing to adopt a single uniform test will 
expose the interpretation of the DTSA to inconsistent extraterritoriality tests which vary by circuit. 
To get ahead of this potential problem and to avoid following into the footsteps of United States 
securities, trademark, and antitrust law, the courts should play its role as federal law interpreters 
in a careful manner. 
                                                 
147 Cannan, supra note 18. 
148 Cohen, Renaud & Armington, supra note 5. 
149 Cannan, supra note 18. 
150 Id. 
151 Cannan, supra note 18. 
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 A. Initial Questions 
In determining the extraterritorial reach of the DTSA, the court should first address three 
fundamental questions that will create an extraterritoriality test that reflects United States 
trademark goals and policy. 
 
1. What is the trade secret policy in the United States? 
2. Who are the trade secret laws designed to protect? 
3. What extraterritorial standard can best reflect the concerns raised by trade secret 
law?155 
 The first question is posed to determine the purpose behind the DTSA to ensure a uniform 
test that aligns with those purposes.156 Determining the trade secret policy of the United States 
involves an analysis of statutory language and congressional intent.157 As mentioned in detail 
above, the DTSA was enacted to punish those who misappropriate trade secrets, whether United 
States citizens or foreign entities.158 Congress explicitly included an extraterritorial provision, 
identical to the provision in the EEA, both of which are intended to have a broad application to 
regulate both foreign and domestic violations of the DTSA.159 
 
 The second question addresses who the trade secret laws are designed to protect.160 The 
DTSA was enacted to protect United States citizens and business owners with a protectable trade 
secret.161 The DTSA’s extraterritorial provision reflects the desire to provide United States citizens 
and business owners with a remedy for misappropriation by foreign entities. The DTSA is also 
designed to protect the federal government’s right to regulate commerce.162 An inference can be 
drawn that the DTSA is a comprehensive statute, protecting all United States citizens who may 
fall victim to the misappropriation of trade secrets by whomever attempts to violate the law.  
 
 After considering the findings of the first two questions, it is up to the courts to decide on 
a uniform extraterritorial test for claims under the DTSA that will align with trade secret policy 
and protect those intended to be protected by Congress.163 Courts should do so with an awareness 
of the fundamental importance of the trade secret law to our economic and social system. Any 
extraterritorial test for the DTSA should reflect Congress’ intent in protecting United States 
citizens and business owners from misappropriation by any party. The question then becomes, 
                                                 
155 Rholl, supra note 122, at 464. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 Cohen, Renaud & Armington, supra note 5. 
159 See Bohrer supra note 1. 
160 Rholl, supra note 122, at 464. 
161 Cohen, Renaud & Armington, supra note 5. 
162 See 18 U.S.C.S. § 1837 (West 2018). 
163 Rholl, supra note 122, at 465. 
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which, if any, of the extraterritorial tests implemented by various courts in other areas of federal 
law, can accommodate such a requirement. 
 
 
B.  Various Effects Tests 
In determining extraterritorial reach, the effects test enables the courts to extend the statute 
to reach the conduct of foreign entities, as long as such conduct has an effect on the United 
States.164  The focus of the effects test is not upon where the actors are located or where the 
misappropriation takes place, but rather the activity and the alleged impact it has on the United 
States.165 The effects test “satisf[ies] the concept of territoriality by treating the impact of the 
conduct as much a part of the crime as the conduct itself.”166  
 
The effects test is used in several different ways across various federal statutes that have 
extraterritorial reach. In order to implement a workable uniform effects test for the DTSA, the test 
must be accepted by all federal courts. Without uniformity, the DTSA will be subject to the same 
interpretation inconsistences conducted by the courts pertaining to other federal extraterritoriality 
provisions.  Setting precedent for a single effects test for the DTSA will further two indispensable 
trade secret policy needs: uniformity and predictability in scope and application. 
 
 Various versions of an effects test are used by the courts when interpreting the 
extraterritorial reach of other federal statutes. United States securities law used the conducts and 
effects tests consistently, until the extraterritoriality test was disrupted by the Morrison decision, 
introducing the transactional test.167 Like many, the conducts and effects tests were not sufficiently 
narrow enough, resulting in suits against foreign entities that had no actual connection to the United 
States.168 The Morrison decision was a response to this problem.169 The transactional test 
essentially states that securities purchases on American exchanges are fair game and purchases 
abroad of foreign companies are not.170 While seemingly a simple principal, capital markets can 
be more complex.171 Morrison’s transactional test yielded results that put certain domestic 
transactions out of reach.172 Thereafter, Congress enacted a body of law effectively seen to revive 
the effects test, causing great confusion with the courts and leading them to apply both tests.173 
Without further clarity by the courts, using both the effects and transactional test will yield varied 
results, making the tests in conjunction unworkable. Drawing from United States securities law, 
the conducts and effects test would seemingly be the best fit for the extraterritoriality interpretation 
of the DTSA, with some revision to narrow its scope.  
                                                 
164 Najeeb Samie, The Doctrine of Effects and the Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws, 14 U. MIAMI 
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United States trademark law uses a variety of effects test, all of which the required level of 
effect differs depending on the circuit.174 In allowing each circuit to enact their own version of an 
effects test, this frustrates the fundamental need for uniformity in applying the extraterritoriality 
provision in the DTSA. The Second circuit’s three factor effects test would be inapplicable because 
it prohibits a plaintiff from bringing an action against a foreign entity because it requires the 
defendant to be a United States citizen.175 The DTSA already expressly states that the statute 
applies to conduct occurring outside of the United States if the offender is a citizen or organized 
under the laws of the United States, but goes on to further extend applicability to “an act in 
furtherance of the offense” committed in the United States.176 The Ninth circuit’s multi-factor 
effects test would fail to give individual’s or small business owner’s much protection because its 
heavy emphasis on the effect on foreign and United States commerce.177 The First Circuit’s 
“substantial effects” test would likely be the best fit for the extraterritorial application of the DTSA 
but would also require further narrowing to avoid inconsistent interpretations between the circuits.  
 
Lastly, United States antitrust law also shuffled between several tests, first enacting a 
broad effects test.178 In an attempt to narrow the focus, the courts expanded on the test, causing it 
to lose any real applicability.179 Some courts responded by abandoning the effects test and in its 
place, creating a balancing test.180 The balancing test inquires whether the conduct is of such 
“type and magnitude so as to be cognizable as a violation” of the statute.181 This test effectively 
forces the court to decide on whether the conduct constitutes a violation of the statute before 
deciding extraterritorial reach. Thereafter, Congress stepped in, enacting a “direct, substantial, 
and reasonably foreseeable effect” test to be applied but the test failed to be applied as uniformly 
as Congress had intended because of its broad scope.182 
 
 When presented with the issue of interpreting the extraterritorial reach of the DTSA for the 
first time, the courts will need to implement a new effects test that will not falter when applied in 
other circuits. Many effects tests fail due to their overly broad language that cannot sustain the 
increasingly varied situations that will be brought to the courts by trade secret owners. Courts in 
antitrust extraterritorial cases have implemented describing an effects test using a term of art to 
hone in on the scope of the effect.183 For example, in applying a standard of “anticompetitive 
effects,” the term of art specifies in the name the nature of the effects that will trigger 
extraterritoriality.184 In an “anticompetitive effects” test the effects analyzed would include 
competition restraints, monopolization of markets, and fix prices.185  
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C.   “Misappropriation Effects” Test 
The courts should implement a “misappropriation effects” test to be applied to the 
extraterritoriality interpretation of the DSTA. “Misappropriation effects” will be incorporated as a 
term of art to be applied in all extraterritorial inquiries for the DTSA. Using a term of art will 
provide the courts with a test that will not be confused with other extraterritorial effects tests. 
Rather than referring to the level of effects necessary to give rise to the DTSA’s reach, the term 
relates to the nature of the effects that will trigger applicability. This will ensure that courts narrow 
their inquiry to whether the infringer’s conduct effects the trade secret owner, taking the emphasis 
off the level of effect sufficiently necessary to give rise to a showing of effects. 
 
“Misappropriation effects” will include those effects felt by a citizen or business owner 
when their trade secrets are misappropriated. These effects typically include but are not limited to 
those which cause a citizen or business to lose profits, face price erosion, experience increased 
costs, and cause damage to the market. It is these effects that Congress sought to protect against in 
proscribing the DTSA and should be considered when inquiring the statute’s extraterritorial reach. 
The legislative history of the DTSA infers Congress’s intent in conducting a broad and liberal 
interpretation of the extraterritoriality provision. Before the DTSA was passed, Congress’s 
discussion centered on protect United States citizens and business owners from trade secret 
misappropriation abroad. Thus, interpreting the extraterritoriality provision by focusing on the 
nature of the effects rather than the level of effects would better serve Congress’s intent. This 
inquiry should not interrupt the courts inquiry as to whether the conduct actually violates the 
DTSA, but rather only to consider whether the DTSA applies extraterritorially to the alleged 
conduct. 
 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 When the courts are faced with the task of interpreting the extraterritorial reach of the 
Defend Trade Secrets Act for the first time, they should be prepared to enact a single, uniform 
“misappropriation effects” test. Failure to set precedent of a test that will not falter when applied 
in different situations and by different circuits will lead the extraterritorial inquiry of the DTSA to 
fall into the trap of many other federal law extraterritorial effects tests that came before it. Various 
versions of effects tests provide the courts with a test susceptible to many different interpretations, 
rendering unpredictable results.  
 
 In creating a uniform test for the extraterritorial provision of the DSTA, the courts should 
keep in mind the trade secret policy goals of the United States. The courts should also consider the 
protections Congress sought to create for trade secret owners under the DTSA. When faced with 
the task, the courts will need to enact a test that reflects these concerns, keeping judicial 
interpretation to a minimum to provide consistency. The “misappropriation effects” test meets this 
standard.  
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